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Abstract
Berger,  Hasan, and Klapper contribute to both the  economic  performance, and that the marginal benefits of
finance-growth  literature and the community banking  higher shares  are greater when the banks are more
literature  by testing  the effects  of the relative  health of  efficient.  Only mixed support is found for hypothesized
community  banks on economic growth,  and investigating  transmission mechanisms  through improved financing
potential transmission  mechanisms  for these effects using  for small and medium enterprises or greater  overall bank
data from 1993-2000 on 49  nations.  Data from both  credit flows.  Data from developing nations are  also
industrial and developing nations suggest that greater  consistent with  favorable  economic effects  of foreign-
market shares  and efficiency  ranks of small,  private,  owned banks, but unfavorable  effects  from state-owned
domestically-owned  banks are associated with better  banks.
This paper-a  product  of Finance,  Development  Research  Group-is  part  of a  larger  effort  in  the  group  to  study
international banking.  Copies of the paper are available free from  the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC
20433.  Please  contact  Agnes  Yaptenco,  room MC3-446,  telephone  202-473-1823,  fax  202-522-1155,  email  address
ayaptenco@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The
authors may  be contacted  at aberger@frb.gov,  hasan@rpi.edu,  or Iklapper@worldbank.org.  August 2003.  (38 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if  the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers cariy the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors,  or the
countries they represent.
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An International Analysis  of Community Banking and Economic  Performance
An important research development of the last decade has been the affirmation of a strong link between
the financial system of a nation and the performance of that nation's economy.  Starting with King and Levine
(1993),  the  research  has  generally  found that  countries  with "better"  financial  systems  tend  to  have  faster
economic growth.  However, this research has not come to consensus regarding exactly which dimensions of the
financial system matter most - the size, efficiency, competitiveness, and regulation of  banks; the roles of  nonbank
financial institutions,  such as finance companies, buyout funds, venture capital funds, and insurance companies;
the scale  and liquidity of public debt and equity markets; the legal rights of shareholders  and creditors;  and so
forth.  As well, the exact transmission mechanism from the financial system to real activity is less than perfectly
transparent  from  the research  results.  It is not completely  clear the extent to which a better financial  system
improves  economic  growth  primarily  through  higher  levels  of investment,  or primarily  through  targeting
investments to more productive  uses.'
We try to contribute to the finance-growth literature by focusing on one dimension of the financial system
and how its effects  may be transmitted into economic growth.  Specifically,  we test hypotheses about how the
health of community banks relative to other banks affects a nation's economy.  We hypothesize that relatively
large market shares and relatively high efficiency  for community banks may promote economic  growth.  One
transmission mechanism may be through  improved  financing opportunities  for small and medium enterprises
(SMEs).  Community banks may provide more credit to SMEs and may target their credit toward more productive
SMEs, given the advantages that community banks may have this type of  lending.  A stronger SME sector may, in
turn,  be an engine of economic  growth  through  enhanced  entrepreneurship  and risk-taking,  increased  private
ownership of  businesses,  potentially high productivity of these firms, and/or increased competition that reduces
the market power of entrenched large firms and stimulates their productivity.  A second mode of transmission may
be through greater overall flows of bank credit.  Healthier community banks may not only have provide greater
credit flows from their own portfolios,  but  might also compete  more  effectively with the rest of the banking
industry and reduce  the market power of other banks, encouraging them to reduce prices and expand lending.
We test the hypotheses using data on 49 nations from  1993-2000, representing a rich mixture of  economic
conditions, market structures, and degrees of  development.  Our key exogenous variables measuring the relative
I In  the interest of brevity, we will not review the finance-growth  literature here.  See Wachtel (2003) for a recent review.health of community banks are the total market shares of  community banks (defined in various ways), and their
weighted-average  efficiency ranks estimated using cost and profit functions for the banks in each nation in each
year.  Importantly, these variables measure the health ofcommunity banks relative to other banks within the same
nation, rather than comparisons of individual banks across nations that operate under very different conditions.  As
a consequence,  these relative health variables are reasonably comparable across nations.
We run three sets of tests separately for 21 developed nations and for the 28 developing nations.  First, we
run reduced-form  regressions of gross domestic product (GDP) growth on the relative health of community banks,
controlling for other dimensions of the financial system (public debt and equity markets,  regulation,  legal rights,
bank competition) identified in the finance-growth  literature.  This allows us to test whether the relative health of
community banks affects economic growth.
Second, we try adding measures of the SME employment  share and the ratio of overall bank lending to
GDP as additional regressors to these GDP growth equations to test the transmission mechanisms.  In a recursive
model of the transmission  mechanisms,  community bank  health  would  directly  affect one or both of these
intermediate variables and then these variables would directly affect economic growth.  Thus, to the extent that
improved SME financing is an important mechanism through which relatively strong community banks improve
economic growth, then we may expect a positive measured effect of the SME employment share on GDP growth,
and a substantial diminishment of  the measured effects of community bank health on GDP growth when the SME
employment share is controlled for in the regressions.  Similarly, if  greater overall  flows of bank credit is a key
transmission mechanism, then we may expect a positive measured effect ofthe overall-bank-lending-to-GDP  ratio
and substantial diminishment of  the measured effects of  the relative health of community banks on GDP growth
when the overall bank lending variable  is included in the regressions.
Third, we regress the SME employment  share and bank  lending to GDP ratio on the relative health of
community banks and the control variables.  We test whether community bank health has positive effects on the
SME sector and on overall bank lending, as predicted by the two transmission mechanisms.
In addition to trying to contribute to the finance-growth  literature, we try to add to the community banking
literature in several ways.  First, we examine the effects of community banks on overall economic performance.
Community  banking  studies  often  focus  on  flows  of credit  to  SMEs,  but  generally  do  not  examine  the
2consequences of this flow for the national  economy.2 Even if healthy community banks tend to channel more
credit to SMEs, this may not translate into higher economic growth if the credit flows to SMEs are ineffective, or
if  there  are significant  adverse consequences  of the relatively poor health of other (non-community)  banks.3
Second, our international orientation and application to many developed and developing nations differs
from the traditional focus of community banking studies on a single developed nation. We acknowledge that as in
any study involving international comparisons,  some rather heroic assumptions are needed,  because one cannot
control  for the many differences  in culture, markets, regulatory  structures,  and data collection standards across
nations.  We try to mitigate  these  problems  through  the means  noted  above - 1) analyzing  developed  and
developing nations separately, 2) using measures of community banking health relative to other banks within the
same nation, and 3) including controls for other important national  differences.
Third, we allow for different potential definitions of community banks in our empirical analysis, rather
than  defining them  one way.  For developed  nations,  we use the conventional  definition  - small,  private,
domestically-owned  institutions  - based  on  the  research  that  suggests  that these  banks  have  comparative
advantages  in lending to SMEs, a core function of community banks.  For developing nations, we allow for the
possibility that state-owned banks and foreign-owned banks may also function as community banks when small,
private,  domestically-owned  banks have difficulty providing sufficient credit.  The market penetrations of state-
owned and foreign-owned  banks are substantial  in many countries  around the world, and there are often large
differences  in the shares of these banks across countries within the same region.  For example, assets at state-
owned banks are 52% of the total in Brazil versus  12%  in Chile, whereas foreign-owned banking assets are only
17% of the total in Brazil  versus 32%  in Chile (Barth,  Caprio,  and Levine 2001).  As discussed below, state-
owned and foreign-owned institutions may be able to overcome some of their disadvantages in SME lending by
using government  subsidies, by organizing  in a decentralized fashion, or by using superior technologies.
Finally, we include the average efficiency ranks of community banks as well as the market shares ofthese
institutions.  Community banking research  often focuses on the share or quantity effect of these banks without
2  few studies do directly examine the economic consequences  of community banking.  One study finds that deregulation of
geographic restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking by U.S.  states raised the rates of new-business incorporations in
these states (Black and Strahan 2002).  Another study finds that reductions in capital at small banks in U.S. states during the
early  1990s credit crunch led to significant reductions in  the employmnent,  payroll, and number of small businesses  in these
states (Hancock and Wilcox  1998).
3One study does find positive associations between the SME employment ratio and both economic growth and development
(Beck, Demirgtlc-Kunt,  and Levine 2003a).
3considering their efficiency or quality.  A relatively high  share for community banks may not have favorable
economic effects if these banks are poorly managed.  It seems more likelythat communitybanks will be effective
if these institutions  are also relatively efficient.  We  also  include the interaction  between  market shares  and
efficiency ranks, with the expectation of a positive interaction effect.  That is,  we expect the marginal benefit of  an
increase  in market share for community banks to be greater,  the more efficient are these banks.
By way  of preview,  the  data from  both  developed  and  developing  nations  are consistent  with the
hypotheses  that  greater  market  shares  and  higher  weighted-average  efficiency  ranks  of  small,  private,
domestically-owned  banks are  associated with  faster GDP growth.  The coefficients  on the interaction  terms
between market shares and efficiency ranks are also positive,  consistent with the hypothesis that the marginal
benefits of higher shares for community banks are greater when these banks are more efficient.  The data provide
only mixed support for the two hypothesized transmission mechanisms from the relative health of community
banks to economic growth through improved financing opportunities for SMEs or through greater overall flows of
bank credit.  For developing  nations, the data are also consistent with favorable  economic effects from larger
market shares for foreign-owned banks, but the converse holds for larger shares for state-owned  banks.
Sections I and 2 briefly review the extant literatures on community banking in developed and developing
nations, respectively.  Section 3 deals with data and efficiency estimation issues.  Section 4 shows our empirical
models and results, and Section 5 concludes.
1.  Brief review of prior findinis on community bankine in developed  nations
We briefly review the extant research on community banking in developed nations, focusing on which
categories of banks have comparative  advantages  in the core function of SME  lending.  We discuss available
information relevant to the advantages and disadvantages of small versus large  banks, state-owned  banks, and
foreign-owned  banks.  It will  become  clear why we  choose  the  conventional  definition  of small,  private,
domestically-owned  institutions as community banks for our analysis of developed nations.
1.1.  SmaHl  versus large banks in developed  nations
There is a significant amount of research on the issue of the advantages related to bank size in engaging in
relationship lending to informationally opaque SMEs in developed nations.  Under relationship lending, banks
accumulate proprietary information through contact over time with the firm, its owner, its suppliers, its customers,
and its local community on a variety ofdimensions.  Some of  this relationship-based information is "soft," i.e., not
easilyquantified or verified, such as information about characterand  reliability ofthe firm's owner.  Relationship
4lending is distinguished  from transactions  lending,  under which due diligence and contract terms are generally
based on "hard" information that is quantifiable and verifiable at the time of  origination, such as certified audited
financial statements, payments histories,  collateral that is easy to value and sell, or credit scores.
Large banks are hypothesized to have difficulty in extending relationship loans to informationally opaque
SMEs.  Large banks may suffer Williamson-type organizational  diseconomies of  providing relationship lending
services along with the transactions lending services and other services to their large corporate customers because
of the different technologies  employed (Williamson  1967,  1988).  It may also be difficult for large banks to
transmit the soft information  associated with relationship lending through the communication  channels of large
banking organizations (Stein 2002).  As well, the fact that the loan officer is the repository for this information
may create  agency problems within the banking organization that require a closely-held  structure  with few
managerial layers that large organizations cannot easily accommodate  (Berger and Udell 2002).  In addition, large
banks are on average  headquartered at longer distances from potential  SME relationship  borrowers, making it
difficult to process locally-based soft information (Hauswald and Marquez 2002).
The empirical  literature using data from developed nations generally supports the hypothesis that large
banks are disadvantaged  in SME lending.  Studies often find that large banks allocate a much lower proportion of
their assets to SME loans than do small banks (e.g., Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995) and that the ratio of  SMvE
loans to assets declines after large banks are involved in M&As (e.g., Berger, Saunders,  Scalise, and Udell 1998,
Peek and  Rosengren  1998,  Strahan  and Weston  1998).  Some  studies  also examine the type of SME  loans
extended by large banks and find that they tend to a) lend to larger, older, more financially secure firms (Haynes,
Ou, and Bemey  1999), b)  charge lower rates, earn  lower yields, and require collateral less often on their SME
loans (e.g., Hannan 1991, Berger and Udell 1996, Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge 2004), c) have shorter and less
exclusive relationships (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2002), d) base their lending decisions more on
financial ratios rather than prior relationships (Cole, Goldberg, and White 1999, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan,
and Stein 2002), and e) lend at greater distances and have less personal contact with borrowers (Berger, Miller,
Petersen,  Rajan,  and  Stein  2002),  consistent  with  comparative  disadvantages  of large  banks  in  extending
relationship credit.4
4I  mportantly,  a significant  disadvantage  for  large  banks  does not necessarily  imply a significant  lack  of supply of
relationship-based  credit in their markets because there may be "extemal effects"  in which other existing banks react and
increase their own supplies (e.g., Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998, Berger, Goldberg, and White 2001,  Avery and
Samolyk 2004) or new banks form to help offset the  lack of supply (Berger, Bonime, Goldberg,  White, forthcoming).
51.2.  State-owned  banks in developed  nations
State-owned  banks that lend to SMEs and potentially serve as community banks is less of an issue in
developed nations than in developing nations,  botui because the market presence of state-ow,ned banks is usually
nuch less in developed nations and bec-use these nations typically have well-developed  -rivate  banking industries
that lessen any need  for government  involvement.  Nonetheless, most developed nations do have state-owned
banks.  A study of 92 developed and developing nations as of 1995 finds only 7 nations with no state ownership of
banks - Canada,  Cyprus,  Hong Kong, New Zealand,  South Africa,  U.K., and  the U.S. (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).5  Because of their lesser importance  in developed nations, we exclude state-owned
banks from consideration  from the definition of community banks in these countries.
1.3.  Foreign-owned  banks in developed  nations
roreign-owTieu' baiI  -Sii  .ay  bue at signifi  antdisadvar.aes  In pIrviduiI reIaI,iooship  legII...,  serv-  L
SMEs in developed nations.  Foreign-owned banks are usually large and headquartered far away from local SMEs,
and so may suffer size- and distance-related disadvantages similar to those of large domestically-owned  banks.  In
addition, differences  in economic conditions,  language,  culture, and regulatory structure from the bank's home
market may compound problems  in dealing with soft relationship information.
There is very little direct evidence of  the SME lending propensity of foreign-owned banks in developed
nations, but several types of indirect evidence reinforce the argument that foreign-owned banks are unlikely to be
oriented toward providing relationship-lending services to SNivs in  uhese naLions.  In somiecases,'  lvreign,-u-w--ud
banking organizations engage in the "follow-yourr-customer"  strategy of  settingup offices in nations where their
large corporate home-nation customers have foreign affiliates, and so are likely to have a wholesale orientation
(e.g.,  Goldberg  and  Saunders  1981,  Grosse  and  Goldberg  1991).  In  addition,  foreign-owned  banking
organizations  in  the U.S. tend to have a wholesale orientation  (e.g.,  DeYoung and Nolle  1996),  and to buy
domestic banks that already have performance problems and so may find it difficult to extend credit (e.g., Peek,
Rosengren, and Kasirye  1999).  Most studies of the efficiency of foreign-owned  banks in developed nations find
these institutions to be less efficient on average than domestically-owned  banks, with the possible exception of
5Governments  of both  developed  and  developing  nations  may also  promote  SME  financing  in  other ways.  Some
gove* r  .er,ts subsi,dize  01  lendi..g  IA,  support fp..vat=sector barnks, such as,  the Sprkassen in Germanuy.  OLthers
use government  guarantees  for SME loans,  such as the  Small Business Administration  guarantees  in the U.S.  Some
governments also nromote access to financing is by organizing public credit information bureaus or by encouraging private-
sector information exchanges.  These exchanges may collect, summarize, and share data about loan applicants that might
reduce  lender costs or increase transparency in ways that increase  SME credit (see Jappelli and Pagano 2002).U.S.-owned banks operating abroad (e.g., DeYoung and Nolle 1996, Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell 2000).
Based  on the evidence  given here, we exclude foreign-owned  banks from consideration  from the definition  of
community banks  in developed nations.
2.  Brief review of prior findings on community  banking in developing  nations
As discussed  in  Section  1, small, private  domestically-owned  banks  in developed  nations  may have
advantages  in  lending  to informationally  opaque  SMEs.  In developing  countries,  other  types  of financial
institutions also often make substantial portions of the SME loans, including state-owned banks, foreign-owned
banks,  and  large  microlenders.  When  conventionally-defined  community  banks  have  difficulty  providing
sufficient credit, these alternative types of  community banks may be able to overcome some of their disadvantages
by  using  government  subsidies,  by  organizing  themselves  in a  decentralized  fashion,  or  by using  better
technologies to collect and analyze hard credit information than other banks in these nations.
2.1.  State-owned  banks in developing  nations
State-owned  banks include both direct and indirect state ownership (via other state-owned institutions,
such as insurance  companies),  although the government  often names  the chairman  and other board members.
These banks may have been established by socialist governments, such as the transition nations in Eastern Europe,
or created or nationalized to redirect credit to "underserved"  sectors and populations,  as India.  In other cases,
these are former private banks that were nationalized during a distress period,  as occurred  in East Asia. 6
State-owned  institutions may be directly subsidized by taxpayers or indirectly subsidized through a higher
likelihood of govemment bailout in the event of default than similarly-sized  private  institutions.  These public
institutions generally have a stated policy agenda to develop a specific industry, sector, or region, and they often
make  loans  at  subsidized  (below-market)  rates.  These  goals  may  include  increasing  competition  and
diversification  within an  industry,  assistance to new entrepreneurs,  expansion  of exports, etc.  As discussed
further below, efficiency ranks for state-owned banks may not be as relevant for private institutions, since these
banks may not try to maximize efficiency.
Some research  shows  that state-owned  banks  in very underdeveloped  financial  systems  direct credit
6 A class of state-owned institutions is development banks, which may operate as fully state-owned government agencies or
corporations  and may or may not be subject to prudential  bank regulation versus independent  oversight as a government
agency.  These banks generally  receive most of their funds from the government,  as well  as bilateral and multinational
agencies  (such as the World Bank) and may or may not take deposits. We do not include development banks in  our analysis
because of data  limitations.
7towards small- and micro-enterprises that would not have received credit otherwise, but that the nonperforming
loan  rate at many of these institutions  is very high  (Hanson 2002).  Most of the research  suggests that large
concentrations of state bank ownership have some unfavorable economic consequences,  such as reduced overall
access to financing,  increased  likelihood of financial  crises, or diminished financial  system development (e.g.,
Barth, Caprio,  and Levine 1999, Clarke and Cull 2002, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer 2002).  These
unfavorable consequences  may occur in part because of  weak governance,  lack of aggressive collection procedures
that encourages a poor credit culture, or because some of the resources may be channeled for political purposes
(e.g.,  Sapienza forthcoming).  See Appendix  I for examples of state-owned banks  in developing nations.
2.2.  Foreign-owned  banks in developing  nations
Foreign bank participation has increased in emerging markets around the world, in part because of the
removal of barriers to direct foreign ownership of  financial firms, bank restructurings, financial crises, and state-
owned bank privatizations.  These banks may be able to overcome any disadvantages to SME lending due to size,
distance, and differing home market conditions described above because they often step into markets where the
supply of credit to SME from domestic banks may be lacking for various reasons.  Whereas the foreign-owned
banks may be disadvantaged  in relationship  lending to informationally opaque SMEs because of difficulties in
using soft information, these banks may have advantages in transactions lending to some SMEs because of  better
access  to information  technologies  for collecting  and  assessing hard  information.  For example,  Citibank's
"Citibusiness"  initiative  provides  SME  financing  in  18  countries  using  industry-level  data  to make  credit
decisions.  Credit is  targeted  to SMEs  in  the  industrial  segments of the nation  identified  as having growth
potential, in some cases without historical credit information on the specific firms.7
One  study of foreign  bank  participation  in  over  80 countries  finds that foreign  banks  have  higher
profitability in emerging markets, whereas the opposite is true in developed countries (Claessens, Demirgiic-Kunt,
and Huizinga 2001).  Thus, relative inefficiency of  foreign-owned  banks in developed nations reported above may
be reversed in developing nations in which the competition from domestically-owned banks may not be as strong.
Most other studies of lending by foreign-owned  banks are also consistent with these banks performing relatively
well.  One study finds evidence that foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico may provide credit smoothing and
7Another example is  GE Capital's Budapest Bank, a former state-owned bank that was privatized.  GE Capital offers new
technology and U.S.-based training for Budapest Bank SME'loan officers,  consistent  with exploitation of advantages  in
transactions lending.
8financial  stability during financial  crises (Goldberg,  Dages,  and Kinney 2000).  Another  study using data for
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru finds that large foreign banks in Chile and Columbia lend slightly more (as
share oftotal lending) to SMEs than large domestic banks, although their findings are not significant for Argentina
and Peru (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez 2002).  Furthermore, a global survey of firms fnds that firms
of all sizes are less likely to identify high  interest rates and access to long-term  loans as obstacles to growth in
countries with higher foreign-bank  participation  (Clarke,  Cull,  and Martinez Peria 2002).  However,  foreign-
owned banks may concentrate their lending in large loans and to SMEs with favorable hard information available.
One  study finds that  large,  foreign-owned  banks  in Argentina  appear to have  problems supplying  credit to
informationally opaque SMEs (Berger, Klapper,  and Udell 2001).
23. Large microlenders in developing nations
Large microlenders - both private and state-owned - are additional  potential providers  of community
banking services.  Microloans  are generally defined  as very small, unsecured,  short-term  loans to low-income
clients.  These clients are often self-employed  entrepreneurs  in the informal, unregulated  sector of the economy,
such  as  individuals  that  sell  without business  licenses  and  may  not keep  accounting  records  or  pay taxes.
Commercial banks may be unwilling to lend to such clients using standard credit practices, but microlenders may
be able to provide credit using alternative practices (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2000, Robinson 2001).8
We are not able to separately identify the large microlenders in our empirical analysis.  In most countries,
non-governmental  organizations (NGOs)  and commercial microlenders are not regulated by the bank regulators
(although  some may take  deposits) and  do not have  public  filing requirements,  and  so their  information  is
a  In recent years, there has been a significant increase in  large, profitable lending by microfinance lenders that have operated
without government subsidies.  The trend from non-profit to for-profit, "commercial"  microlending  reduces this sector's
dependence  on government  subsidies  and  outlays,  while  improving  services  to  the  poor.  The  commercialization  of
microlenders  in Latin America has been shown to not reduce their goal of providing credit to the poorer clients (Peck 2000).
It is argued  that the majority  of successful  microfinance  institutions  are private  institutions  that lend  on  market-based
principles (CGAP Focus Note 1997).  This report also suggests that state-owned microfinance institutions are often subject to
political influences and suffer from poor lending practices, such as weak borrower selection criteria and subsidized lending
rates. An example is Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), a profitable state-owned bank and microfinance lender.  It operates with
US$12 billion in assets,  a nationwide  network of 325  branch offices and 3,595 unit "desas" that provide microfinancial
products.  Until the  1980s, all lending decisions were made centrally,  local units had no financial accountability,  and bank
arrears rose to over 30%.  The key to the bank's turnaround success was the that desa staffwere given complete operational
autonomy for their unit, without any government mandates  on reaching specific "lending targets"  for specific population
groups.  Each unit desa is treated independently, with its own balance sheet and income statements.  In addition, the bank
requires from each unit clear and transparent financial reporting and imposes local fiscal accountability.  Furthermore,  unit
managers are held accountable  for their performance and receive financial incentives.  This example highlights the potential
benefits  from  a large organization  using decentralization  to offset some of its disadvantages  in SME  lending (Robinson
2001).
9generally unavailable.  In other cases, microlenders may appear in our data set as subsidiaries or departments of
state-owned banks or foreign-owned banks, although we cannot separately identify their microlending activities.9
3.  Data and efficiency  issues
We briefly discuss our data sources, variable definitions,  and give some summary statistics.  We then
briefly outline how the efficiency ranks are computed.
3.1.  Data sources, variable definitions, and summary statistics
We employ both bank-specific and national-level  variables in our analysis.  The bank-specific  data are
taken from the BankScope database, with informnation on over 7,500 banks each year.  The national-level data are
taken from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, World Bank and Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF)
data on World Development Indicators, IMF Intemational Financial Statistics, Wall Street Joumal and Heritage
Foundation Govemance data, and several other public sources.
Table 1 shows definitions  for most of the variables employed  in the analysis,  and also shows summary
statistics for these variables for the developed nations (Panel A) and developing nations (Panel B).  The developed
nations correspond to the IMF definition for "high-income"  countries, and the developing nations correspond to
IME "middle-income"  and "low-income"  countries.  Table  2  shows the names of each  of the developed and
developing  nations  and the numbers  of banks and  potential community  banks  in each  nation  in the sample,
averaged  over the sample period.  As discussed,  for developed nations,  we use the conventional definition of
community banks as small, private, domestically-owned  institutions (SMALL  banks),  whereas for developing
nations, we include state-owned banks (STATE banks) and foreign-owned  banks (FOREIGN banks) as potential
community banks as well.  STATE and FOREIGN  banks are defined as having 50% or more state and foreign
ownership, respectively, although govemment and foreign owners may exert effective control with less than 50%
ownership in some cases.  One other difference is that for developed nations, SMALL banks include institutions
with less than US$1  billion in assets, whereas for developing  nations, SMALL banks are truncated below $100
million in assets due to the smaller bank sizes in developing nations.1 0 This should not create any difficulties of
9For example,  Shorebank Advisory  Services,  a subsidiary of the U.S.-owned  Shorebank Corporation has transferred its
expertise  in providing  commercial  and  housing  loans in underserved  markets in the  U.S. to international  development
initiatives around the world.  It has ownership relationships with institutions in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America that
aim to increase  financing to  SMEs.  For instance,  Shorebank  began  operating  in Azerbaijan  in 1998  to finance  new
businesses.  By 2002, their credit portfolio in  Azerbaijan reached US$1  million and loan sizes increased from US$4,000 in
1998 to US$100,000 (Tumag 2003).
° The US$1  billion and US$100 million cutoffs for SMALL'banks are based on real  1992 dollars using the CPI.
10comparability, since the data from developed and developing nations are never mixed.
An important caveat is that we do not have data for all banks in every nation.  The BankScope database
covers  banks  in each  nation that control  at least  85%  of the banking assets,  which  may delete a significant
proportion of SMALL banks.  As well, STATE banks in some nations may be significantly underrepresented  in
our data set because some STATE banks do not file the standard accounting forms used in the BankScope data
set.  In addition, for the earlier years of our sample,  FOREIGN bank coverage in BankScope may have been less
incomplete.  Thus,  the  STATE and  FOREIGN  market shares may be smaller than  those in  studies that  use
alternative methods of measuring these shares, but we use the shares drawn from BankScope in order to have a
time series-cross section of STATE and FOREIGN  shares that is consistent with our STATE and FOREIGN bank
efficiency measures and the remainder of  our data set.11 While the omission of  some potential community banks
reduces the informativeness  of our analysis,  this data limitation does not eliminate the value of the findings.  It
seems  reasonable  to  assume that the market  shares  and  weighted-average  efficiency  ranks  for  the reporting
community banks are indicative of the health of community banks as a whole relative to other banks.
The three endogenous variables  shown in Table 1  are GDP GROWTH, the annual growth rate of GDP,
SME EMP, the employment share held by SMEs, and BKLENDGDP, the ratio oftotal bank lending to GDP. The
summary statistics for these variables  are for the years 1994-2000.  Data on GDP and total bank lending are taken
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (2002).  Data on SME EMP data are taken from Ayyagari, Beck,
and Demirgaic-Kunt (2002) and Klapper and Sulla (2002).  This data is collected from official government sources
and includes all businesses with less than 250 employees - including services, manufacturing, trade, agriculture,
etc.  The data for GDP GROWTH and BKLENDGDP are available for almost every year for every nation, but we
have significantly fewer observations for SME EMP.
The key exogenous variables for both developed and developing nations include SMALL SHARE, the
total market shares held by SMALL banks, and SMALL COST EFF RANK and SMALL PROFIT EFF RANK,
the  weighted-averages  of cost and profit efficiency  ranks for SMALL banks.  The summary statistics for the
exogenous  variables  shown  are for  1993-1999  because  these variables  are  lagged  one year  in the  empirical
analysis to help mitigate  potential  endogeneity  problems.  The variables  are  computed  from the BankScope
database using information on all the available banks in each nation in each year, and then converted into national
For example,  in  some  cases our STATE  shares are significantly  less than those reported  in Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001), which is based on a survey of bank regulators and supervisors.
11totals or weighted-averages for use in our empirical analysis.  Importantly, these are measures ofthe relative health
of SMALL banks - higher market shares for SMALL banks  implies lower market shares for other banks, and
higher weighted-average  efficiency ranks for SMALL banks means lower efficiency ranks for other banks.  For
the developing nations, we also  include STATE  SHARE, STATE COST EFF RANK,  STATE PROFIT EFF
RANK to measure  the relative health of state-owned banks, and FOREIGN  SHARE, FOREIGN COST EFF
RANK, FOREIGN PROFIT EFF RANK to measure the relative health of foreign-owned institutions.
The control variables  for the market, regulatory, and legal environments  in which the banks compete,
which are shown in other research to be important.  We include MKTCAPGDP, the market value of all publicly
held debt and equity securities relative  to GDP, as an indicator of the development  of public capital  markets,
which is compiled primarily from the IMF International Financial Statistics.12 We include ECON FREEDOM, the
Heritage  Foundation/World  Street Journal  Index of Economic  Freedom,  an  index  that reflects the extent of
government intervention in the economy and monetary policy, banking and financial regulations, relative openness
of trade,  and  related factors.  This variable  ranges from  1 (most freedom) to 5 (least freedom).  We include
COMMON LAW, a dummy for whether the justice system is English Common Law, taken from La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).  Common law is shown to offer greater creditor rights and be associated
with more developed  financial  systems and improved ownership structures (e.g.,  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer,  and Vishny  1997, 1998).  We also specify BANK CR3, the three-bank concentration  ratio computed
from BankScope, to account for differences in market power and access to credit across nations.'3 The structure-
conduct-performance  hypothesis  predicts  higher  prices and  restriction  of credit from  greater  concentration.
However, high concentration may encourage banks to invest in lending relationships because the borrowing frms
are less likely to find alternative future sources of  credit (e.g., Petersen and Rajan  1995).  The empirical research
12 In some cases, missing information was filled in using the Annual Reports of stock exchanges in  the individual nations.
13  The measurement of BANK CR3  may be significantly affected  by some of omissions  from the BankScope  database
discussed below.
12yields mixed findings. 1
4 We also include dummies for region and year of the observation (not shown in Table 1)
3.2.  Computation of efficiency  mnks
Cost and profit efficiency ranks measure how well a bank is predicted to perform relative to other banks in
a particular sample or a peer group for producing the same output bundle under the same exogenous conditions.
In our case, we estimate efficiency ranks relative to banks in the same nation in the same year.
We specify the commonly-used translog functional form to estimate the cost and profit functions for each
nation for each year.  For convenience, we show only the cost function:
ln(C/w2z,) = oo + 8,  ln(y,/z,) + 82  In(Y 2 /Z)  + 83  ln(y3/zl)
+ '/2 all In(yI/z,) In(y,/z,) + 1/2 822  In(y2/z,) ln(y2/zl) + 1/2 833  ln(y 3/zl) Iln(y 3/z,)
+ Y/2  812  ln(y,/zI) In(y2/z,) + '/2 813  ln(y,/z,)  In(y3/z,) +  Y/2  823  In(y 2/zl) ln(y3/zl)
+ PI  In(w 1/w2 ) + 'A2  ol  ln(w,/w2 ) ln(wl/W 2 )
+ 01 ln(y,/zl)  ln(w1/w2) + 02 ln(y2/z,) ln(w,/w2 ) + 03 In(yj/zl) ln(w/w 2),
+ In u 1,+ In vi,,  (I)
where C represents the bank's total costs.  The cost function includes three variable output variablesy (total loans,
other earning assets, and total deposits), two variable  input price variables w (the noninterest expenses to fixed
assets, and interest expenses to total deposits), and one fixed input z (financial equity capital).  The In u term is a
factor that represents a bank's efficiency and Inv is a random error that incorporates both measurement error and
luck.  The cost function is estimated using the (Inu + Inv) as a composite error term.  The normalization by bank
equity (z,) reduces heteroskedasticity, and allows banks of  any size to have comparable residual terms from which
the efficiency ranks are calculated.  The normalization by the last input price (w2) ensures price homogeneity.
The level  of cost efficiency of a bank is determined by comparing  its actual costs to the best-practice
14 For example, many studies find negative effects of bank concentration,  such as higher loan rates and less new firm creation
and expansion (e.g., Hannan 1991, Black and Strahan 2002, Cetorelli 2002, Cetorelli and Strahan 2002).  In contrast, other
studies find positive effects of  bank concentration, such as higher growth rates in the number of  new firms and greater access
to  financing by consumers,  small  firms,  new manufacturing  firms,  and mature  finns  (e.g.,  Petersen  and  Rajan  1995,
DeYoung,  Goldberg, and White  1999, Bonaccorsi  di Patti  and Dell'Ariccia  2001, Cetorelli 2002).  One study of Italian
banking finds that concentration has a positive effect on access to financing by SMEs, but a negative effect on large firms
(Bonaccorsi  di Patti and Gobbi 2001).  One study with data on both developed and developing nations finds that firns in
nations with greater bank concentration  are less able to access bank financing, although the impact of bank concentration
decreases with firm size and greater national financial development (Beck, Demirgtlc-Kunt,  and Levine 2003b).  Another
study of 41  developed and  developing nations  fnds higher  growth  in industries  in which  young firms  are especially
dependent on extemal finance  in nations with greater bank concentration (Cetorelli and Gambera 2001).
13minimum costs to produce the same output under the same conditions using estimates of  the efficiency factor In  u,
which is disentangled from the estimated cost function residual using some distributional assumptions.'5 For our
purposes, we use the efficiency rank, for which we need use only the ordering of the residuals, which are assumed
to be in the same order as the In u. That is, we assume that the bank with the highest cost function residual is the
least efficient, the one with the lowest residual is the most efficient, and so forth in between these extremes.  We
create a rank ordering  of the banks  in each  year within a nation  based on the residuals.  The ranks are then
converted  to  a uniform  scale  over  [0,1]  using the formula (orderit  - I)/(nt  - 1),  where  orderi, is the  place  in
descending order of the ith bank in the tth year in terms of its residual and nt is the number of banks in the nation
in year t. Thus, the bank i's efficiency rank in year t gives the proportion of the other sample banks in that nation
and year with lower efficiency (e.g., a bank in year t with efficiency better than 70% of other banks in the country
has a rank of 0.70).  The bank with the highest residual has the worst rank of 0 [(I - 1)/(n, - 1)], and the bank with
the lowest residual has the best rank of I  [(nt - 1)/(n.  - 1)].
The use of efficiency ranks is preferred over the efficiency levels because the ranks are more comparable
over  nations  and  across  time.  The  ranks  for every nation  and  time  period  follow the  same  uniform  [0,1]
distribution, whereas the distributions of efficiency levels may be very different,  depending on conditions in the
nation and time period.  We wish to abstract from these differences and focus on relative efficiency within a nation
and time period.  That is, our null and altemative hypotheses are about the health of  community banks relative to
other banks in the same nation at the same time, and the weighted-average efficiency rank of community banks
should  mean  about the same thing in any nation  at any time.  For example,  a value of 0.50 would mean that
community banks are on average equally efficient with other banks in their nation and time period.
Profit efficiency ranks are estimated  in a similar fashion.  Total profits replace total costs and we add a
constant  before taking the log to avoid  taking a log of negative  number.  We also rearrange  the residuals  in
ascending order, so that the bank with the highest profit function residual  is given the highest rank of 1.16  The
profit efficiency ranks may be considered to be the more accurate indicator of  the quality of the management of  the
institution,  at least for private  institutions, given that profit efficiency  is the more general concept and that the
managerial  goals are more likely achieved by higher profits than lower costs.
'5  For a general description and examples of bank efficiency estimation,  see Berger and Mester (1997).
16 The use of output quantities, rather than output prices is  necessitated by the lack of accurate data on output prices.  Other
arguments also favor the use of this alternative profit function (see Berger and Mester  1997).
14Some caveats apply to the use of  efficiency ranks for STATE banks in developing nations.  These banks
may have goals other than  minimizing costs or maximizing profits (e.g.,  "directed lending"), which  may make
their measured efficiency ranks inaccurate indicators of managerial quality. As well, these institutions often have
unusual balance sheets.  STATE banks in some cases operate with very little equity (their equity is effectively the
nation's  treasury).  Profit efficiency  measures for these banks may  also be compromised  in  some cases by
understated  losses  or  overstated  revenues on problem  loans, as  STATE  banks often rollover  or  reschedule
payments on such loans, rather than classifying them as nonperforming or losses (Hanson 2002).
Similar concerns apply to the measured efficiency ranks of FOREIGN banks in developing nations, as
there may be cross-subsidies from the parent banking organization  in another nation.  As well, FOREIGN banks
may be able to operate with very little financial capital, in effect, using the capital of organization as a whole. 17 In
some cases, FOREIGN banks may be set up to serve established  corporate customers with operations in many
nations, so that some of the related costs and revenues may be booked in other nations.
4.  Empirical models  and results
We first briefly show our empirical models.  We then give the empirical results using SMALL banks as
our definition of  community banks for both developed and developing nations.  We also report the findings when
we also allow STATE and FOREIGN  banks to act as community banks  for developing  nations.  As well, we
briefly discuss some of the measured effects of the control variables and report additional robustness checks.
4.1.  Empirical models
For our first set of tests of the effects of the relative health of community banks on economic growth for
developed nations, we run the reduced-form regressions:
GDP GROWTH = a +  Pi *SMALL SHARE + P2*SMALL EFF RANK
+ 01 2*SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK
+ yi*MKTCAPGDP  + y2*ECON FREEDOM
+ y3*COMMON LAW + y4*  BANK CR3
+ Control variables for region and year.  (2)
7 Our definition of FOREIGN banks includes both subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks,  although we do not make a
distinction in  our empirical analysis.  In  some nations, subsidiaries and branches are subject to different capital requirements.
15The dependent variable is GDP GROWTH.  For developed nations, we use the conventional definition of
community banks - small,  private,  domestically-owned  institutions with less than US$1  billion - or SMALL
banks.  The key exogenous  variables measuring the relative health of these banks are their total market shares
(SMALL SHARE), their weighted-average  efficiency ranks (SMALL EFF RANK) measured using either the cost
or profit efficiency  concept, and the interaction  between  share and efficiency  rank (SMALL SHARE  x EFF
RANK).  We also include the control variables described above (MKTCAPGDP, ECON FREEDOM, COMMON
LAW,  BANK CR3),  and dummies for the  region  (Asia,  Oceania, and Western  Europe, with North America
excluded as the base case) and for the year of the observation (1994,  ...  1999, with year 2000 excluded as the base
case).  As noted, the exogenous variables (other than the region and time dummies) are lagged one year.
We estimate 6 regressions with various forms of the specification in equation (2) to check the robustness
of the findings.  Regression I includes SMALL SHARE and SMALL EFF RANK using cost efficiency rank, and
the regional and time dummies (i.e., excludes the interaction  effect of share and efficiency rank and the national-
level control variables).  Regression 2 is identical to Regression I except that it is based on profit efficiency rank,
rather than cost efficiency rank.  Regressions 3 and 4 add the interaction term SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK to
the specifications,  and Regressions 5 and 6 also add the national-level  control variables, MKTCAPGDP,  ECON
FREEDOM,  COMMON LAW, and BANK CR3.
We acknowledge the possibilityof simultaneous-equations  bias in equation (2)-  that higher GDP growth
may affect the health of community banks in ways for which we are unable to control in the regressions.  We try to
mitigate this potential problem in two ways, although we cannot entirely eliminate  it.  First, we use measures of
the relative health of  community banks rather than absolute values, so that any endogeneity is effective only to the
extent that higher GDP growth affects community banks more than other banks in the nation.  Second, as noted,
we also measure our exogenous variables with a one-year lag, which mitigates the potential endogeneity problem
because the future cannot cause the past.  As discussed  below, we also try robustness  checks with  longer lags.
For our second set of tests for developed  nations, we add SME EMP and BKLENDGDP as additional
regressors to these GDP GROWTH equations in (2) to test the transmission mechanisms.  In a recursive model of
the transmission mechanisms, the relative health of community banks would affect one or both of these variables
and then these variables  would directly affect GDP GROWTH.  We test for positive effects of SME EMP and
BKLENDGDP  on GDP GROWTH to see if  these variables directly influence economic growth.  We also test for
diminishment of the measured effects of  community bank health on GDP GROWTH, which is expected to occur
16to the extent that the effects of this health  on economic  growth are transmitted  through  improved  financing
opportunities  for SMEs  or through  increased overall  flows of bank  credit.  These regressions  are  subject to
additional potential endogeneity problems to the extent that GDP GROWTH directly increases or decreases the
SME employment share or bank lending relative to GDP.
For our third set of tests for developed nations, we regress SME EMP and BKLENDGDP  on the measures
of the relative health of community banks  and the control variables,  i.e., using the same  specification of the
regressors as in equation (2).  We test whether relative community bank health has the positive effects that would
be predicted  by recursive models of the two transmission  mechanisms.  As above  for the GDP  GROWTH
equation, the SME EMP  and BKLENDGDP  equations are subject to possible simultaneous-equations  bias if
higher SME employment or greater overall bank lending affects the relative health of community banks in ways
for which we are unable to control.  As examples, the bias may occur if  a stronger SME sector increases demand
for community banking  services or if greater overall  bank lending increases  GDP growth that in tum benefits
community banks.  We again try to mitigate the potential problem by using relative  measures of the health of
community banks and by measuring these variables with a one-year  lag.
For the developing nations, we first use equation (2) and run the same tests as for the developed nations
except for the slightly different definition of  small banks (less than US$100 million in assets, rather than less than
US$I billion), and different regional dummies (Asia, Africa, and Transition  [formerly Socialist Eastem Europe],
with Latin America excluded as the base case).
For the developing  nations,  we also  adjust the model to allow for the possibility that STATE and
FOREIGN  banks may act as community banks:
GDP GROWTH  = a  +  ,B,*SMALL SHARE +  3 2*SMALL EFF RANK
+ PI2*SMALL  SHARE x EFF RANK
+ o,*STATE SHARE + 52*STATE EFF RANK
+ 812*STATE SHARE x EFF RANK
+ 01*FOREIGN SHARE + 02*FOREIGN EFF RANK
+ 012*FOREIGN  SHARE x EFF RANK
+ y,*MKTCAPGDP  + y2*ECON FREEDOM
+ y3*COMMON LAW + Y4*  BANK CR3
17+ Control variables  for region and year.  (3)
In equation (3), we add the total market shares, weighted-average efficiency ranks, and interaction terms
for both STATE banks and FOREIGN banks and treat all three as potential types of community banks.  All of the
tests using SME EMP and BKLENDGDP are run analogously.
4.2.  Results  for developed  nations using SMALL banls as community  banks
The  results  for  developed  nations  are  shown  in  Table  3.  Panel  A  reports  the  results  for  the  6
specifications of equation (2) for GDP GROWTH for the first set of tests.  Panel B, Regressions 7 and 8 show the
effects  of adding  SME  EMP  and  BKLENDGDP  as  additional  regressors  to full  specifications  of the GDP
GROWTH  equations.  Panel  B,  Regressions  9  to  12  give  the  findings  from  specifying  SME  EMP  and
BKLENDGDP as the dependent variables for our third set of tests.
In Panel A, the estimated  coefficients  on SMALL  SHARE and SMALL EFF RANK are positive and
statistically significant  at the  10%  level  or better  in all 6  cases  - using both  cost and profit efficiency  ranks,
including or excluding the interaction of share and efficiency rank, and including or excluding the national-level
control variables - consistent with the hypothesis that developed nations with relatively healthy community banks
have greater GDP growth, all else equal.  The estimated coefficients on the interaction  term SMALL SHARE x
EFF RANK are also positive in all cases in which it appears, and are statistically significant at least the  10%  level
in the full specifications using both cost and profit efficiency ranks.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that the
marginal benefit of a higher market share for community banks is greater, the more efficient these banks are.
We evaluate the economic significance of these findings by evaluating the effects of  changing the market
share of community banks by 10 percentage  points, and (separately) changing the weighted-average  efficiency
rank of community banks by 10 percentage points.  We evaluate the effects for a typical nation with a SMALL
SHARE  of 0.25 and a SMALL SHARE and SMALL EFF RANK of 0.50 using the most complete specifications
shown in Regressions 5 and 6.
The marginal effect of  an increase in SMALL SHARE is oGDP GROWTHI/SMALL  SHARE = Pi + P12
x SMALL EFF RANK,  where PI  and 112 are the coefficients on SMALL SHARE and the interaction term as
shown in equation (2).  Substituting in the coefficient estimates from Regression 5 in Panel A of Table 3 and a
value for SMALL EFF RANK of  0.50 gives 0.034 + 0.026 x 0.50 = 0.047.  Using the estimates from Regression
6 gives 0.042 + 0.013  x 0.50 = 0.0485.  Thus, an increase in SMALL SHARE of 0.10  is estimated to increase
18GDP GROWTH by about 0.005 (i.e., = 0.10 x 0.05) or about 1/2 of one percentage point, which is economically
significant relative to the mean GDP GROWTH of 0.030 or 3.0%.
The marginal effect of  an increase in the SMALL EFF RANK is oGDP GROWTHISSMALL EFF RANK
= P2  + P12 x SMALL SHARE.  Using the coefficient estimates from Regressions 5 and 6 in Panel A of Table 3
and a value for SMALL SHARE of  0.25 gives 0.033 + 0.026 x 0.25 = 0.0395 and 0.005 + 0.013 x 0.25 = 0.0083.
Thus, an increase in SMALL EFF RANK of 0.10 is estimated to increase GDP GROWTH by about 0.004 (cost)
and 0.001  (profit) or about  I to 4 tenths of one percentage  point.
In  Panel  B  of  Table  3,  we  add  SME  EMP  and  BKLENDGDP  as  additional  regressors  to  full
specifications of the GDP GROWTH equations using cost and profit efficiency ranks  in Regressions  7 and 8,
respectively.  The estimated coefficients of both SME EMP and BKLENDGDP are positive in all 4 cases, but are
statistically significant at the  10% level in just 2 cases.  In terms of economic  significance, an increase in these
variables of 0.10 is estimated to increase GDP GROWTH by about 2 tenths of one percentage point (SME EMP)
and less than one tenth (BKLENDGDP) of one percentage point.  The measured effects of  community bank health
on GDP GROWTH do not appear to be substantially diminished by the inclusion of the SME and bank lending
variables, which casts some doubt on the strength of  the hypothesized  transmission mechanisms.  As noted, these
regressions may be subject to additional endogeneity problems to the extent that GDP GROWTH directly affects
SME EMP or BKLENDGDP.
In Regressions  9-12 of Panel B in Table 3, the estimated coefficients on SMALL SHARE, SMALL EFF
RANK, and the interaction term SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK are positive and statistically significant at the
10% level or better in all cases for both the SME EMP and BKLENDGDP equations.  This is consistent with the
two hypothesized transmission  mechanisms,  although we are mindful of the potential endogeneity problem  in
which SME EMP or BKLENDGDP may affect the relative health of community banks.  In terms of economic
significance, an increase in SMALL SHARE of 0.10 is estimated to increase SME EMP by 0.03545 using cost
efficiency ranks  in Regression  9 and by 0.0785 using profit efficiency ranks  in Regression  10, or about 3 to 8
percentage points, which are economically significant relative to the mean SME EMP of 0.600 or 60 percent.  An
increase in SMALL EFF RANK of 0.10 is estimated to increase SME EMP by 0.01408  (cost) and by 0.05540
(profit) or about  I to 6 percentage  points.  In terms of effects  on overall  bank lending, an increase in  SMALL
SHARE of 0.10  is estimated  to increase BKLENDGDP  by 0.0168 (cost) and by 0.02175  (profit) or about 2
percentage points, and an increase in SMALL EFF RANK of 0.10 yields estimated effects on BKLENDGDP of
190.02045  (cost) and 0.01353  (profit) or about  Ihto 2 percentage points.
4.3.  Results for developing  nations using SMALL  banhs as community  banks
Table 4  shows our  first set of results  for developing  nations,  which  specify only SMALL  banks as
community banks.  In Panel A, the estimated  coefficients on SMALL SHARE, SMALL EFF RANK, and the
interaction term SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK are positive and statistically significant at at least the 10% level,
and are robust across the specifications.  Consistent with developed-nations  results, the developing-nations  data
support the hypotheses that relatively healthy SMALL banks are associated with faster economic growth, and that
the marginal  benefit of a higher market share for these banks is higher when these banks are more efficient. 18
With respect to economic significance, an increase in SMALL SHARE of 0.10 is predicted to increase
GDP GROWTH by 0.00947 (cost) and by 0.0 1945 (profit) or about I to 2 percentage points, which are large in
magnitude. An increase in SMALL EFF RANK of 0.10 is estimated to increase GDP GROWTH by 0.0068 (cost)
and 0.00538 (profit) or about  1/2 of one percentage point.
In Regressions 7 and 8 in Panel B of Table 4, the estimated coefficients  of SME EMP are positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level.  An increase in SME EMP of  0.10 is estimated to increase GDP GROWTH
by about V 2 of one percentage point.  The estimated BKLENDGDP coefficients are positive but not statistically
significant (and so we do not calculate their economic significance).  Again, the measured effects of community
bank health on GDP GROWTH do not appear to be substantially diminished by the inclusion of SME EMP and
BKLENDGDP.
In Regressions 9-12, the estimated coefficients on SMALL SHARE and SMALL EFF RANK are positive
and statistically significant in all cases for both the SME EMP and BKLENDGDP  equations, and the interaction
term SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK is positive in all cases, and but not always statistically significant.  In terms
of effects on SME employment,  an increase in SMALL SHARE of 0.10 is estimated to increase  SME EMP  by
0.0091  (cost) and by 0.0266 (profit),  or about  1  to 3 percentage points.  An increase in SMALL EFF RANK of
0. 1O is estimated to increase  SME EMP by 0.021 (cost) and by 0.0205  (profit) or about 2 percentage points.  In
terms of effects  on overall  bank  lending,  an  increase  in  SMALL  SHARE  of 0.10  is estimated  to  increase
BKLENDGDP  by 0.0098 (cost) and by 0.03135 (profit) or about  1  to 3 percentage points,  and an increase in
18 A related  finance-growth study finds that bank efficiency  is  positively related to economic  growth in four developing
Asian  nations (Ferrier  2001),  but  it is focused on  the  efficiency  of all  banks,  rather than the  relative efficiencies  of
community banks versus other banks.
20SMALL EFF RANK of  0.10 yields estimated effects on BKLENDGDP ofO'01 865 (cost) and 0.02438 (profit) or
about 2 percentage  points.
4.4.  Results  for developing  nations using alternative deinitions  for community  banks
Table 5 shows our second set of results for developing  nations, which includes relative health of STATE
and FOREIGN banks as SMALL banks.  In Panel A, the estimated coefficients on SMALL SHARE, SMALL
EFF RANK, and the interaction term SMALL  SHARE x EFF RANK are positive and statistically significant at
least the 10% level in all the specifications.  An increase  in SMALL SHARE of  0.10 is predicted to increase GDP
GROWTH by 0.0 120 (cost) and by 0.0 1335 (profit) or about I percentage point, and an increase in SMALL EFF
RANK of 0.10 is estimated to increase GDP GROWTH by 0.0085 (cost) and 0.00378 (profit) or about  1/3 to one
full  percentage  point.  The  data again provide  consistent  support for the hypotheses  that relatively  healthy
SMALL  banks are associated  with faster  economic  growth, with  somewhat larger effects  for shares than for
efficiency.  The measured  interaction  effects again support the hypothesis that the marginal  effect of a higher
market share for SMALL banks is greater when the banks are more efficient.
The estimated coefficients on STATE SHARE are all negative and statistically significant.  This supports
the  hypothesis  that  a  larger  state-owned  banking  sector  is  associated  with  adverse  aggregate  economic
performance,  and is consistent with the literature reviewed above.  The coefficients on STATE EFF RANK and
the interaction  term STATE SHARE x EFF RANK are mixed and mostly not statistically significant, consistent
with  the  arguments  above  that  measured  efficiency  ranks  may not be very  meaningful  for  STATE  banks.
Evaluating the  economic  significance  of the  STATE  SHARE  findings  gives somewhat  inconsistent  results,
presumably because of the difficulties with the efficiency effects in the interaction  term.  We do not evaluate the
economic significance of the STATE EFF RANK findings,  since they are not statistically significant.
The  estimated  coefficients  on  FOREIGN  SHARE  are  all positive  and  statistically  significant.  This
supports the hypothesis that a larger foreign-owned  banking sector is generally positively associated with faster
GDP growth in developing  nations, and is generally consistent with the literature.  Similar to the STATE bank
results,  the findings  for the efficiency  ranks of FOREIGN  banks  and their interaction  terms are  not entirely
consistent,  making it difficult to draw strong conclusions  from them or from any tests of economic  significance
based on them.  As noted, the efficiency of FOREIGN banks in developing nations may be difficult to measure.
In Regressions 7 and 8 of  Panel B in Table 5, the estimated coefficients of SME EMP are positive, but are
only statistically significant  in  one of the two  cases at the  10%  level.  An  increase  in  SME  EMP of 0.10  is
21estimated  to increase  GDP  GROWTH  by about  1/3 of one  percentage  point.  The estimated  BKLENDGDP
coefficients  are positive but not statistically significant.  Again, the measured effects of SMALL bank health on
GDP GROWTH do not appear to be substantially diminished by the inclusion of SME EMP and BKLENDGDP,
although the measured  effects of STATE and FOREIGN bank shares may be diminished.
In Regressions 9-12 of  Table 5,  the estimated coefficients on SMALL SHARE and SMALL EFF RANK
are again all positive for both the SME EMP and BKLENDGDP equations, although in one case, the coefficient
on SMALL EFF RANK loses its statistical significance from the inclusion of  the STATE and FOREIGN terms
(i.e.,  it was significant in Table 4, but not in Table 5).  An increase in SMALL SHARE of 0.10 is estimated to
increase  SME  EMP by 0.01565  (cost) and  by 0.0277  (profit),  or about  I to 3 percentage  points, and  a 0.10
increase in SMALL EFF RANK is estimated to increase SME EMP by 0.02968 (cost) and by 0.01635 (profit) or
about 2 to 3 percentage points.  In terms of  effects on overall bank lending, a 0.10 increase in SMALL SHARE is
estimated to increase BKLENDGDP by 0.03190 (cost) and by 0.01195 (profit) or about I to 3 percentage points,
and 0.10  increase  in SMALL EFF RANK raises BKLENDGDP  by estimates of 0.00595  (cost) and 0.00483
(profit) or about  1/2 of one percentage point.  The interaction term SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK is positive in
three of four cases, but loses all of its statistical significance when the STATE and FOREIGN terms are included.
Also in Regressions 9-12 of Table 5, the estimated coefficients on STATE SHARE are all negative and
statistically  significant  and the estimated  coefficients  on FOREIGN  SHARE  are all positive and  statistically
significant.  Analogous  to GDP  GROWTH  findings  above,  greater shares  for STATE  banks  are negatively
associated  with  SME employment  and bank  lending and vice versa  for FOREIGN  banks.  We again do not
evaluate economic significance for these shares because of difficulties  with the measured efficiency effects.
4.5.  Selected  control variable results
We briefly note some of  the findings regarding the control variables for other dimensions of  the financial
system on GDP GROWTH, SME EMP, and BKLENDGDP in the three results tables.  The measured effects of
MKTCAPGDP on GDP growth are positive and statistically significant in all the Panel A regressions in Tables 3,
4, and 5, confirming the standard result in the finance-growth  literature that the development of public debt and
equity capital markets is positively related to economic growth.  The measured effects of MKTCAPGDP on SME
EMP and BKLENDGDP are generally statistically insignificant or inconsistent, which is not surprising, given that
the transmission mechanism for public capital markets is not expected to provide substantial capital to SMEs orto
operate through banks.
22The coefficients on ECON FREEDOM, the index that reflects the extent of government intervention in
monetary policy,  relative openness of trade, and related  issues are negative in all the regressions (although not
always statistically significant),  consistent  with the financial-growth  literature  findings that more  freedom has
beneficial effects.  The findings for COMMON  LAW, which identifies nations with English common law, are
generally insignificant  or  inconsistent,  which  may be  surprising,  given the strength of this variable in other
research.
The findings for BANK CR3 are mixed, as also occurs in the empirical literature.  The coefficients are
generally negative and significantly significant for developed nations, consistent with the exercise of market power
under the structure-conduct-performance  hypothesis.  However, the coefficients are often positive and in some
cases statistically significant for developing nations, consistent with the benefits from market power in terms of
investments  in lending relationships
4.6.  Additional robustness checle
As shown  in the tables above, the main findings with regard to the economic effects of the community
bank health are robust to a number of  factors, including the specification of  either cost or profit efficiency ranks, to
the inclusion or exclusion of the interaction of share and efficiency  rank, and the inclusion or exclusion of the
national-level  control variables for factors identified in the finance-growth  literature.  The main findings are also
shown to hold for both developed  and developing nations.
A number of additional checks not shown in the tables are briefly described here.  First, we try altemative
definitions of the endogenous variables.  For example, we try replacing GDP GROWTH  with GDP growth per
capita, replacing BKLENDGDP with the total-private-sector-credit-to-GDP  ratio, and replacing SME EMP with
the share of enterprises that are  SMEs, and the main results are materially unaffected.
We also try altering the specification of some of  the measures of the relative health of community banks.
For example, we replacing the weighted-average efficiency ranks of the community banks with weighted average
ranks of  other financial ratios that may reflect bank quality- such as the ratio of total costs to assets and the return
on assets ROA.  These replacements yield no material change  in findings.
As well, we try including some additional variables from the finance-growth  literature as extra control
variables.  We try adding a measure of international trade (exports plus imports as a ratio to GDP), and the results
23remain butare weakened.'9 We also try using the bank regulation variable from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001)
- which measures the restrictions on banking organizations engaging in securities,  insurance, real estate activities,
and  ownership  of nonfinancial  firms - in place of our ECON FREEDOM  variable,  and  the main  results are
strengthened.  However, our results are weakened  if  we include both the regulation and freedom variables,  likely
due to collinearity from including two variables measuring regulation.  In addition, we try including a measure of
education (secondary school enrollment percentage, taken from World Development Indicators), and our results
continue  to hold  in most  cases.  As  well,  we  try  including  variables  for Government  Consumption  (from
Intemational  Financial  Statistics) and  Composite Risk (taken from the Wall Street Joumal/Heritage  Foundation
Governance  data), and the main results are robust, albeit weakened.
In addition, we try altering the data sample in several ways.  We try excluding the effects of the Asian
crisis by dropping all observations from Asia for 1997 and 1998.  As a further measure, we try excluding all Asian
observations.  The main results remain robust, but weakened by the reduced numbers of observations.  Similarly,
we find the results to be robust when the Transition nations are excluded.  We also experimented  with extending
the lag structure beyond measuring the exogenous variables with a one-year  lag to further mitigate the potential
endogeneity problem.  We try measuring the dependent variables as two- and three-year averages or growth  rates
to create additional temporal separation between the endogenous and exogenous variables.  The results are robust,
but weaker with two-year averages/growth  rates, and are no longer significant  with three years because of the
substantially reduced numbers of observations.
Finally,  we try  running  the models  specifying fixed-effect  dummies  for each  nation  in place  of the
national-level control  variables (which do not vary much within a nation) and the regional dummies (which are
constant for each nation).  The fndings for the GDP GROWTH and BKLENDGDP regressions remain robust, but
the SME employment regressions become  insignificant due to the smaller numbers of observations.
5.  Conclusions
We test the effects of the relative  health of community banks on economic growth and investigate two
potential transmission mechanisms  for these effects.  The relative health of community banks is measured  by the
total market  shares of these  banks and their weighted-average  efficiency  ranks - indicators  of how well they
perform  relative to other banks  within the same nation.  The potential transmission  mechanisms  are  through
19 We view international trade primarily as an endogenous variable that reflects the vitality of the economy, rather than as
exogenous to economic growth.
24improved financing opportunities for SMEs and through  increased  overall flows of bank credit.  We allow for
different potential definitions of community banks, including the p6ssibilitythat state-owned banks and foreign-
owned banks may function as community banks in developing  nations as well as small, private, domestically-
owned banks.  Our empirical analysis employs data over the period 1993-2000 on the economic performance and
financial systems of 49 nations, as well as detailed financial information  on the individual banks that operate in
these nations.
We try to contribute to two important fields in finance - the finance-growth  literature and the community
banking literature.  We try to add to the finance-growth  literature by 1) focusing on a dimension of the financial
system that is typically not examined in that line of research - the relative health of community banks - and 2)
investigating potential mechanisms for how its effects may be transmitted into economic growth.  We try to extend
the  community  banking  research  by  1) examining  the  effects  of community  banks  on  overall  economic
performance, 2) performing the analysis on an international basis using data from both developed and developing
nations,  3) allowing for  different potential  definitions of community banks, and 4) investigating the effects of
efficiency rank as well as market share and their interactions, i.e.,  investigating the quality as well as quantity of
community banking.
The literature on developed nations generally defines community banks as small, private, domestically-
owned institutions (SMALL banks) because these banks are found to have comparative advantages in some types
of lending  to  SMEs.  Our test results  from both  developed  and  developing  nations  are consistent  with  the
hypothesis that relatively healthy SMALL banks are associated with faster GDP growth.  Both the market shares
and the weighted-average efficiency ranks of these institutions have positive, statistically significant coefficients in
the GDP growth regressions.  The estimated effects of increasing the market shares and efficiency ranks of these
banks are also economically significant.  The coefficients on the interaction  terms between market shares and
efficiency ranks are also positive and statistically significant for both developed and developing nations, consistent
with the hypothesis that the marginal benefits of higher shares for community banks are greater when these banks
are more efficient.
The data provide only mixed support for the two hypothesized transmission mechanisms from the relative
health of community banks to economic growth through improved financing opportunities for SMEs or through
greater overall flows of bank credit.  To scrutinize these mziechanisms,  we test whether  1)  community bank health
has positive  effects  on the SME employment  share and the ratio of oVerall  bank  lending to GDP,  2) these
25intennediate variables  have positive effects on GDP growth, and 3) the addition of these variables to the GDP
1ouw-ul  regressions subs.a;mi  ydi.  urnbl.r.e  thI  iuae  -su  0t1  of comumunilybankheeaulm onGDP growth.  We
find that the relative health of SMALL banks is positively associated with both the SME eemnplment  share and
the overall-bank-lending-to-GDP  ratio  in  both developed  and  developing  nations.  We also  find that these
intermediate variables are positively related to GDP growth, although the relationship is generally only statistically
significant for the SME employment ratio.  However, we do not find substantial diminishment of the measured
effects of the relative health of SMALL banks on GDP growth when the intermediate variables are included in the
GDP growth  regressions for developed or developing nations.
The literature on developing nations suggests that tne definition of  community banks might be extended to
include  At-  te-owned  bankq (STAT-  bsnkc) nr foreia.-nW.sAed  bhanL-c, (TnllPl(  Mnha>L  Qa,.I.  Qs  A  AATT  bm"
These potential alternative  types of community banks may be able to overcome some of their disadvantages  in
SME lending in nations in which SMALL  banks have difficulty providing sufficient credit using subsidies,  by
making use of decentralized organizational  structures, or by employing better technologies.  Our test results from
developing  nations suggest that larger market shares for FOREIGN  banks are associated with better economic
perfornance in terms of faster GDP growth, greater SME employment shares, and higher bank lending to GDP
ratios, but worse econornic  performance  in terms of these outcomes for iarger snares for S TATE institutions.
Thesefindings sugrst that at bast in some c-s,  foreign-owned  ban  r.ay function as comrrunity banks, but
that state-owned banks do not appear to play this role in an effective fashion.  The evidence on efficiency ranks for
STATE and FOREIGN banks do not show consistent patterns,  which may reflect difficulties in measuring the
efficiency ranks of these institutions.  Our findings are robust to a number of  changes in specification, samples, lag
structures,  and so forth.
Our analysis as well as the extent research in both the finance-growth  and community banking literatures
may  help  contribute  to  discussions  of public  policy  toward  domestic  consolidation,  foreign  bank  entry,
priva-ti7tfion  of stateow.ned  bank!s,  a-id -- pport  foIr public crfiit info....a:ion  bu.aus znd"I  oULIer  HmetL1ods of
supporting  SME  lending.  The  extant  research  would  appear  to  be  consistent  with  favorable  economic
consequences  from policies that promote  relatively healthy SMALL banks in both developed and developing
nations.  Notably,  policies that simply protect these  banks from  competition  in product markets or from the
markets for corporate control have been found to lead to more inefficiency  and less growth (e.g., Jayaratne and
Strahan 1996,  1998).  In developing nations, the extant research would also appear to be consistent with favorable
26consequences  from policies that allow FOREIGN banks to enter and from policies that privatize STATE banks or
reduce their market shares in other ways.
Finally, our findings are subject to significant caveats.  The nature of international comparisons requires
heroic  assumptions  because of the many important  differences  across nations for which  it is not  possible to
control.  Although we try to mitigate this problem in several ways, the results should be viewed as only suggestive
of the relationship  between  the  relative  health  of community  banks  and overall  economic  performance.  In
addition, as noted above,  we do not have universal coverage of the banks in each  nation, and may be missing
significant proportions of SMALL,  STATE,  and FOREIGN  banks.  Thus, we have to assume that the market
shares and weighted-average  efficiency  ranks for the reporting community banks  are indicative  of the relative
health of community banks as a whole.  Our findings are also subject to possible simultaneous-equations  bias -
higher GDP growth,  SME employment, or bank lending may affect the health of community banks in ways for
which we are unable to control in the regressions.  We try to mitigate this potential problem by using measures of
the relative health of community banks rather than measures of absolute health, so that the problem occurs only to
the extent that these variables  affect community banks more than other institutions.  As well, we measure our
exogenous variables with lags because the future cannot cause the past.  Although these measures mitigate this
potential  problem,  we  cannot  entirely eliminate  it.  Additional  biases  may  be  introduced  when  the  SME
employment share and the ratio of overall bank lending to GDP are included in the GDP growth regressions to the
extent that GDP growth directly increases or decreases these ratios.  Despite these caveats, we believe our analysis
provides some useful steps in understanding the role of community banks in the link between finance and growth,
and in evaluating some of the research and policy issues regarding  community banking around the world.
27Appendix  1.  Examples of state-owned banks in developing nations
India has a relative large presence of  state-owned banks. An example of  a 100% government owned and
operated financial institution is the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), which has a mandate to
promote growth in small firms and microenterprises.  SIDBI provides funding for fixed assets as well as working
capital, and also helps promote SMEs in both domestic and international  markets, with products ranging from
factoring services to microcredit schemes for women entrepreneurs.  SIDBI has also established a joint venture
with a technical training college to provide IT training.  In addition, SIDBI has established venture capital funds
using government subsidies to promote the automobile, software and other industries.  Note that SIDBI operates as
a fiscal expense to the Government of India.
India also has state-owned institutions that receive government subsidies, but operate as commercial banks
(Hanson 2002).  The largest bank in India is the State Bank of India (SBI), which is over 50% state-owned and
has more than US$45 billion  in total assets.  This bank was formerly privately-owned  and nationalized  in the
1970s as part of a government initiative to take over private banks and redirect credit to underserved  sectors and
populations.  Currently,  over 40% of SBI bank credit is directed  to "priority  sector lending," which includes
agriculture  and  SME  financing,  including  certain castes,  small farmers, and women  cooperatives  (SBI 2001
Annual  Report).  Although  state-owned  banks are  generally  criticized  for overstaffing  and  having weak IT
infrastructures, one study found that foreign-owned  and  private, domestically-owned  banks in India were less
efficient than state-owned banks (Bhattacharya,  Lovell, and Sahay 1997).  However, this finding may be partially
explained by the accounting practices of government auditors.
At the other end of  the spectrum are state-owned institutions that have been successfully privatized.  An
example  is ICICI, which was formed in 1955 at the initiative of the Government of  India and the World Bank to
create a development financial institution for providing medium-term and long-term project financing to Indian
businesses.  During the  1990s, it evolved into a private,  full-service bank.  ICICI is now India's second largest
bank and offers a wide range of banking products and financial  services to retail and corporate  customers.  In
1999, ICICI become the first Indian company to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
28Although state-owned  banks are generally found to have problems in providing financial services and
often require significant government subsidies, there are some exceptional cases of state-owned institutions that
are able to meet their SME lending objectives without explicit government subsidies.  The Mauritius Commercial
Bank (MCB) has less than 5% direct government share,  and is a profitable  and efficient institution (Mauritius
Commercial  Bank  Annual  Report  2002).  In  addition,  the  Thai  Bank  for  Agriculture  and  Agricultural
Cooperatives (BAAC) is a rare  case of a development  bank with mandated lending  objectives that does not
depend on subsidies and succeeds in providing credit to rural farners.  In 1998, the BAAC extended loans to more
than 80% of Thailand's farming households (Townsend and Yaron 2001).
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33Table I -Pand A
Descriptive  Statistics - 21  Develo  Nations
Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
GDP GROWTH  0.030  0.023  -0.025  0.123
SME EMP  0.600  0.164  0.290  0.900
BKLENDGDP  0.950  0.176  0.446  1.470
SMALL SHARE  0.350  0.221  0.061  0.829
SMALL COST EFF RANK  0.510  0.089  0.346  0.669
SMALL PROFIT EFF RANK  0.440  0.099  0.244  0.597
MKTCAPGDP  0.872  . 0.729  0.035  3.856
ECON FREEDOM  2.060  0.352  1.350  2.850
COMMON  LAW  0.250  0.434  0.000  1.000
BANK CR3  0.660  0.149  0.142  0.890
Table I - Panel B
Descriptive  Statistics - 28 Develo  ing Nations
Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
GDP GROWTH  0.030  0.041  -0.148  0.139
SME EMP  0.540  0.201  0.038  0.865
BKLENDGDP  0.800  0.138  0.410  0.995
SMALL SHARE  0.260  0.189  .0.056  0.746
SMALL COST EFF RANK  0.540  0.094  0.342  0.718
SMALL PROFIT EFF RANK  0.560  0.071  0.414  0.661
STATE SHARE  0.230  0.196  0.058  0.763
STATE COST EFF RANK  0.310  0.092  0.107  0.457
STATE PROFIT  EFF RANK  0.360  0.113  0.166  0.690
FOREIGN  SHARE  0.390  0.177  0.054  0.754
FOREIGN COST EFF RANK  0.500  0.120  0.250  0.785
FOREIGN  PROFIT EFF RANK  0.620  0.152  0.330  . 0.861
MKTCAPGDP  0.363  0.354  0.045  1.996
ECON FREEDOM  2.890  0.529  1.800  4.350
COMMON  LAW  0.030  0.158  0.000  1.000
BANK CR3  0.620  0.168  0.035  0.860
The statistics for the endogenous variables, GDP GROWTH, SME EMP, and BKLENDGDP, are based on 1994-200D data.  The exogenous variables are lagged one  year, so their statistics are based on 1993-1999.
data  SMEEMP is the employment shareheld by the SMEs in agiven nation where SMEs are businesses with lessthan250employees.  SMEGDPGROWTHistheannualgrowthrateofGDP;BKLENDGDP  is
the ratio of total bank lending to GDP; SMALL SHARE is the market shareheld by small bankswhere SMALL bankis aprivate, domestically-owned bankwith assets less than $1 billion for developed nations
and with assets less than $  100 million for developing nations; SMALL COST (PROFIT)  EFF RANK is the weighted average cost (profit) efficiency ranks for small banks; STATE is the market share held by state-
owned banks; STATE COST (PROFIT)  EFF RANK is the weighted average cost (profit) efficiency ranks for STATE banks; FOREIGN  SHARE is the market share held by foreign-owned  banks; FOREIGN
COST (PROFIT)  EFF RANK is the weighted average cost (profit) efficiency ranks  for FOREIGN  banks.  MKTCAPGDP  is the market value of all publicly held debt and equity securities  as a ratio to GDP.
ECON FREEDOM is an index  that reflects the extent of government  intervention in monetary policy,  relative openness of trade, and related issues in the nation.  COMMON LAW  is a dummy variable to
differentiate  the nations  with English common law.  BANK CR3 is the asset concentration ratio for the top three banks in the nation.  Data sources are discussed  in the text
34Table 2
Numbers of Banks, SMALL Banks, STATE Banks, and FOREIGN Banks in Developed and Developing Nations, Averaged over 1994-2000
Developed Nations  Developing Nations
Total Number  Number of  Total Number  Number of  Number of  Number of
of Banks  SMALL Banks  of Banks  SMALL Banks  STATE Banks  FOREIGN Banks
Australa  54.5  14.2  Argentina  132.5  39.6  4.5  12.0
Austria  191.6  137.4  Azerbaijan  10.5  9.2  4.0  3.3
Belgium  112.6  59.0  Belarus  14.2  8.1  7.5  10.2
Canada  58.7  24.7  Bolivia  17.7  5.0  4.2  3.5
Denmark  112.1  87.2  Brazil  179.5  45.8  5.5  22.5
Fmnland  13.5  3.5  Bulgaria  25.2  15.5  6.5  11.7
France  454.2  186.2  Chile  35.5  6.2  2.8  12.2
Germany  2368.5  1829.0  Colombia  41.0  2.2  5.0  8.0
Greece  27.8  11.4  Costa Rica  35.2  23.6  5.5  6.8
HongKong  60.1  9.5  Croatia  45.7  21.0  9.5  12.5
Ireland  46.5  12.0  Czech Republc  35.5  5.7  8.5  17.8
Italy  641.4  469.2  Egypt  33.5  1.6  6.5  7.5
Japan  214.1  3.0  Estonia  11.7  6.2  5.2  6.5
Netherlands  79.2  34.9  Hungary  33.2  7.6  7.5  23.7
New Zealand  17.8  7.3  India  74.2  6.3  24.3  6.0
Nonway  53.4  27.0  Kazakhstn  19.5  1.6  5.2  4.6
Spain  189.7  79.5  Korea, Rep.  33.0  14.8  6.5  5.8
Sweden  36.2  10.3  Latvia  29.2  20.5  5.1  10.2
Switzerland  328.6  275.7  Mexico  58.7  8.5  6.8  12.5
United Kingdom  276.4  220.2  Peru  26.5  5.5  7.2  6.6
United States  1166.1  368.5  Philippines  51.5  6.8  7.5  6.2
Poland  57.0  7.6  8.5  29.3
Romania  34.2  17.5  4.2  12.5
Russia  162.7  78.5  6.8  10-.7
Slovak Republic  22.5  6.8  4.5  14.5
Slovenia  28.2  6.5  8.0  6.5
Tunisia  15.4  3.5  5.2  9.7
Turkey  64.1  8.7  15.8  14.2
Notes: For most nations, the statistics reported here are based on 1994-2000  axerages.  In  a few cases, data are not available for some of the nations in certain years,
especially  for 1994.  For these scenarios, we show the average based on the available years.  A SMALL bank is a private, domestically-owned  bank with assets
less than $1 billion for developed nations and with assets  less than $100 million  for developing nations.  STATE  and FOREIGN  banks refer to state-owned  and
foreign-owned  banks, respectively.
35Tabk 3 - Panel A
Developed Nations
DependentVariable:  GDP GROWTH
Regression  I  Regression  2  Regression 3  Regression 4  Regression  5  Regression 6
Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit
Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat
Intercept  -0.001"'  4.15  0.027 *'*  3.02  -0.001"  -1.99  0.028"  2:43  0.036  1.60  0.051  1.48
SMALL SHARE  0.032**  2.07  0.047**'  4.94  0.029"  2.05  0.051"  2.24  0.034"  2.45  0.042*"  2.17
SMALLEFF RANK  0.043*  1.95  0.021'  1.87  0.041"*  2.21  0.024*  1.89  0.033*  1.70  0.005*  1.77
SMALLSHARE  xEFF  RANK  - - - - 0.011  1.62  0.008"  2.16  0.026*  1.87  0.013**  2.25
MKTCAPGDP  - - - - - - - 0.018**  1.98  0.011**  2.20
ECON FREEDOM  - - - - - - - .-  -0.012  -1.07  -0.016  -0.92
COMMONLAW  - - - - - - - 0.007*  1.91  0.011'  1.68
BANK CR3  - - - - - - - - -0.016'  -1.92  -0.012'  -1.80
ASIA  -0.001'  -1.68  -0.003  -0.16  -0.001  -0.02  -0.003  -0.18  -0.004  -0.18  -0.005  -0.26
OCEANIA  0.005'  1.81  -0.001  -0.20  0.016'  1.71  -0.002  -0.20  0.009*  1.68  -0.012  -0.96
WESTERNEUROPE  0.010  1.02  0.011I  2.50  0.005  1.04  0.011*"  2.46  0.006  0.93  0.013**  2.05
Adjusted R-Squared  0.3437  0.3282  0.3535  0.3437  0.3903  0.3952
Number of Observations  137  137  137  137  137  137
Table 3 - Panel B
Developed Nations
DependentVariable:  GDP GROWTH  Dependent Variable: SME EMP  Dependent Variable:  BKLENDGDP
Regression 7  Regression  8  Regression  9  Regression  10  Regression  II  Regression  12
Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit
Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Paran=eter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat
Intercept  . 0.055  1.32  0.067  1.45  0.908"*  2.12  1.066*"  2.43  0.840*  1.74  0.633**  2.10
SMALLSHARE  0.044'  1.80  0.044'  1.75  0.115'  1.94  0.299**  :2.59  0.121*  1.70  0.189'  1.89
SMALLEFFRANK  0.005'  . 1.75  0.002*  1.66  0.021'  1.77  0.311**  2.25  0.181"  2.53.  0.121*"  2.68
SMALL SHARE  x EFF  RANK  0.002  1.23  0.012'  1.70  0.479*  1.68  0.972"*  2.03  0.094*  1.82  0.057'  1.85
MKTCAPGDP  0.014**  1.99  0.002**  2.14  0.017  1.38  0.005  1.26  . 0.015  0.02  -0.026  -0.36
ECON FREEDOM  -0.015  -0.82  -0.017  -0.81  -0.016  -1.12  -0.229'  -1.75  -0.116**  2.75  0.231  0.95
COMMON LAW  0.010  1.23  0.009'  1.72  -0.061  -0.91  -0.032'  1.90  -0.128'  -1.90  -0.159'  -1.66
BANK CR3  -0.014  -1.02  -0.010  -0.93  -0.276'  -1.89  -0.229'  -1.74  -0.253  -1.17  -0.383*  -1.69
SMEEMP  0.017''  1.70  0.018  1.61  - - - - - - - -
BKLENDGDP  0.006  1.42  0.005'  1.77  - - - - - - - -
ASIA  -0.005  -1.23  -0.005  -1.22  -0.061  -0.91  -0.048  -1.30  0.643**  2.38  0.663*"  2.41
OCEANIA  0.011*  1.67  -0.010*  -1.70  -0.053  -0.88  -0.047  -1.07  0.136  1.37  0.109  1.10
WESTERN EUROPE  0.007  0.97  0.013*"  2.08  -0.029  0.54  0.032  1.44  0.221*"  2.39  0.142*  1.83
Adjusted R-Squared  0.4349  0.4196  0.1327  0.1448  0.3254  0.3371
Number of Observations  60  60  60  60  137  137
Notes: *,  **,  "* indicate significanceat  10,5, and I percent levels,  respectiely, based on heteroskedasticitycorrectedstandarderrors.  SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK is the interaction  betven
SMALL SHARE  and SMALL EFF RANK.  Time dummies are included, but are not shown in the table.  ASIA, OCEANIA,  and WESTERN EUROPE are regional dummnies (NORTH
AMERICA  is the excluded region).
36Table 4 - Panel A
Developing Nations
Dependent Variable: GDP GROWTH
Regression  I  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4  Regression 5  Regression 6
Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit
Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat
Intercept  0.023*  1.66  0.007  0.60  0.017  1.31  0.035  0.93  0.013  0.45  0.031  1.05
SMALLSHARE  0.035**  2.34  0.038**  2.59  0.036**  2.83  0.123**  2.75  0.127**  2.44  0.117***  2.88
SMALLEFFRANK  0.012**  2.15  0.042**  2.27  0.026*  1.90  0.037**  1.98  0.027*  1.80  0.016**  1.96
SMALL SHARE  x EFF  RANK  - - - 0.166*"  3.29  0.159**  2.05  0.164***  3.16  0.151**  2.07
MKTCAPGDP  - - - - - - - - 0.005'  1.79  0.004*  1.68
ECON FREEDOM  - - - - - - - - *0.007*  -1.72  -0.008'  -1.76
COMMON LAW  - - - - - - - - 0.021  1.58  0.021  1.53
BANKCR3  - - - - - - - - 0.014  0.74  0.017  0.86
ASIA  0.009*  1.85  0.008  0.73  0.009*  1.86  0.008  0.73  0.011*  1.76  0.010  0.90
AFRICA  0.005  1.33  0.007  1.05  0.007  1.35  0.007  1.05  0.009  1.08  0.006  1.13
TRANSITION  -0.008*  -1.70  -0.009'  -1.73  -0.008*  -1.66  -0.009*  -1.73  -0.008*  -1.68  -0.008'  -1.82
Adjusted R-Squared  0.0512  0.0729  0.0873  0.0950  0.0931  0.0996
Number of Observations  243  243  243  243  243  243
Table 4 - Panel B
Developing Nations
Dependent Variable: GDP GROWTH  Dependent Variable:  SME EMP  Dependent Variable:  BKLENDGDP
Regression 7  Regression 8  Regression 9  Regression  10  Regression  II  Regression  12
Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit
Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat
Intercept  -0.027  -0.62  0.019  0.45  0.614**  2.07  0.7140  1.66  1.060***  10.72  0.931***  12.03
SMALL SHARE  0.122**  2.37  0.110**  2.11  0.075*  1.68  0.216'  1.79  0.009*  1.90  0.282*  1.86
SMALLEFFRANK  0.017*  1.81  0.006*  1.77  0.202**  2.77  0.180*  2.56  0.142*  1.73  0.228**  2.05
SMALLSHARE  xEFF  RANK  0.167***  3.24  0.147*  1.80  0.032*  1.86  0.10  1.60  0.178  1.33  0.063*  1.76
MKTCAPGDP  0.006*  1.85  0.006*  1.89  0.023  0.98  0.034  1.42  -0.085  1.45  0.014*  1.83
ECON FREEDOM  -0.004  -1.40  -0.005  -1.60  -0.048**  -2.47  -0.046**  -2.16  -0.096**  -2.44  -0.107**  2.78
COMMONLAW  0.016  1.09  0.016  1.47  0.094  1.55  0.080  129  0.001  0.10  0.014  0.31
BANK  CR3  0.009  0.45  0.010  0.50  0.099  1.45  0.126*  1.81  0.084  1.21  0.069  1.13
SME EMP  0.050**  2.39  0.053**  2.59  - - - - - - -
BKLENDGDP  0.009  1.49  0.007  0.26  - - - - - - - -
ASIA  0.003  0.29  0.002  0.21  0.153**  2.84  0.136**  2.36  0.076**  2.53  0.089***  3.02
AFRICA  0.003  0.20  0.001  0.06  0.121**  2.00  0.100  1.65  0.003  0.08  0.002  0.065
TRANSITION  -0.004*  -0.73  -0.004*  -1.72  -0.067***  -2.99  -0.068***  -2.97  -0.025  -1.45  -0.025  -1.49
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1105  0.1097  0.1382  0.1297  0.1760  0.2056
Number of Observations  85  85  85  85  243  243
Notes: ', ", "* indicatesignificanceat  10,5, and I percent levels, respectively, based on heteroskedasticitycorrectedstandarderrors.  SMALL SHARE x EFF RANK is the interaction between
SMALL SHARE and SMALL EFF RANK.  Time dummies are included, but are not shown in the table.  ASIA,  AFRICA, and TRANSITION  are regional dummies (LATIN AMERICA is the
excluded region).
37Table 5 -Panel A
DevelopingNations
Dependent Variable:  GDP GROWiTH
Regression  I  Regression  2  Regression 3  Regression  4  Regression  5  Regression 6
Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit
Parameter  t-stat  Pamrameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat
Intercept  0.008  0.51  -0.009  -0.57  0.011  0.57  0.019  0.85  -0.027  -0.63  0.034  0.76
SMALL SHARE  0.027*  1.94  0.045**  2.76  0.041 *  2.81  0.097**  2.00  0.032**  2.20  0.088*  1.84
SMALL EFF  RANK  0.038**  2.34  0.049**  2.58  0.047**  2.07  0.016*  1.83  0.041 *  1.91  0.015*  1.75
SMIALL SHARE  x EFF  RANK--  - - 0.168***  3.40  0.092**  2.45  0.176***  3.42  0.091 *  1.74
STATESHARE  -0.042*  -1.71  -0.03 1*  -2.06  -0.061 *  -1.72  -0.1820*  -2.22  -0.056*  1.70  -0.181**  -2.12
STATE EFF RANK  0.010  0.14  0.022  0.31  0.056  0.64  0.030  0.41  0.183  1.57  -0.134  -0.37
STATE SHARE  x EFF  RANK--  - - 0.161  1.05  0.194**  2.77  0.207  1.18  0.214**  2.18
FOREIGN  SHARE  0.025**  1.99  0.081*  1.84  0.103**  1.98  0.056*  1.86  0.210**  2.68  0.060*  1.93
FOREIGN EFF RANK  0.001  1.42  0.007  0.32  0.021  0.58  0.011  -0.45  0.066  1.35  0.004  0.15
FOREIGN  SHARE  x EFF  RANK  - - - - .0.150  -0.36  -0.034  -0.85  -0.138  -0.54  -0.048  -1.00
MKTCAPGDP-----  - - - 0.004*  1.86  0.003*  1.70
ECON FREEDOM  .--  ---  .0.011  -1.64  .0.01I0*  -1.73
COMMON  LAW  ------  - 0.056*  1.75  0.005*  1.66
BANK CR3  ---  ----  0.013  0.59  0.031  1.27
ASIA  -0.001  -0.26  -0.001  -0.07  -0.001  -0.25  -0.001  -0.37  -0.028  -0.44  -0.020  -1.62
AFRICA  -0.005  -0.42  -0.016  1.43  -0.004  -0.45  -0.015  -1.49  -0.029  -0.82  -0.026  -0.78
TRANSITION  .0.186**  -2.10  -0.025**  -2.84  -0.196**  -2.13  .0.172**  -2.15  .0.020**  -2.08  -0.025**  -2.19
Adjusted R-Squared  0.0934  0.0994  0.1169  0.1238  0.1321  0.1437
Number of Observations  243  243  243  243  243  243
Table  5 -Panel B
DevelopingNations
Dependent Variable: GDP GROWTH  Dependent Variable:  SME EMP  Dependent Variable:  BKLENDGDP
Regression  7  Regression  8  Regression 9  Regression  1  0  Regression  I11  Regression  12
Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit  Cost  Profit
Parameter  t-stat  Paramneter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat  Parameter  t-stat
Iniercept  -0.021  0.20  -0.006  -0.37  0.456  1.19  1.06* *  2.81  0.872***  8.14  1.  112* **  8.43
SMALLSHARE  0.160**  2.63  0.094*  1.74  0.107*  1.~78  0.032*  1.77  0.242**  2.77  0.457**  2.51
SMALL EFF RANK  0.019*  1.78  0.015*  1.66  0.272*  1.69  0.041 *  1.80  0.021  0.45  0.217**  2.76
SMALL SHARE  x EFF  RANK  0.165**  2.80  0.143*  1.94  0.099  1.04  0.490  0.81  0.154  0.99  -0.675  -1.05
STATE SHARE  -0.015*  -1.90  -0.016*  -1.83  .0.988*  -1.84  .1.271**  -1.96  -.. 91***  7.43  7.755***  3.38
STATE  EFF RANK  -0.139  -0.90  -0.130  -0.89  0.402  0.62  0.382  0.52  1.452  1.20  0.657  0.95
STATE SHARE  x EFF  RANK  0.1950*  2.06  0.10l**  2.08  2.031  1.23  1.299**  2.08  2.2443**  -2.68  -0.350**  2.00
FOREIGN  SHARE  0.051 *  1.70  0.042*  1.85  0.0 16*  1.67  0.459*  1.82  0.335***  3.50  0.175**  2.64
FOREIGN  EFF RANK  0.008  0.17  0.002  0.92  -0.246  -0.57  0.027  1.11  -0.163  -0.52  -0.049  -1.20
FOREIGN  SHARE  x EFF  RANK  -0.048  -0.55  -0.038  -0.93  0.141  1.05  0.367  0.83  0.041**  2.71  0.082*  1.78
MKTCAPGDP  0.006*  1.80  0.003  1.54  0.107  1.62  0.066*  1.90  -0.004  -0.35  -0.001  -0.13
ECON FREEDOM  -0.009  -0.37  -0.009  -1.43  -0.075*  1.91  -0.075  -0.62  -0.011  -1.47  .0. I I***  3.33
COMMON LAW  0.023  1.62  0.023  1.60  0.064  1.25  0.113  0.81  0.245***  3.41  0.096**  1.96
BANK CR3  0.020  0.55  0.021  1.17  0.249  1.02  0.047  0.26  .0.014*  -1.80  -0.014  0.28
SME EMP  0.03 1  *  1.74  0.033  1.65  - - - - --  - -
BKLENDGDP  0.047  0.96  0.040  0.82  --  - - - - --
ASIA  -0.015  -0.08  -0.015  -0.94  0.145**  2.16  0.173*  1.89  0.019  0.70  0.0454*  1.86
AFRICA  0.012  0.32  0.008  0.25  -0.016  -1.23  -0.013  1.00  -0.138**  -2.69  .0. 112*  -2.21
TRANSITION  .0.019*  -1.68  .0.019*  -1.81  -0.089  -1.40  -0.072  -1.51  .0.071***  -3.61  -0.065***  3.08
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1459  0.1605  0.1159  0.1468  0.2470  0.2613
Number of Observations  85  85  85  85  243  243
Notes: *, **  ** indicatesignificanceat  10, 5,  and I percentlevels, respectiweIy,  basedon hetereskedasticity.coffected standarderrors.  SMALL SHARE xEFF RANK, STATE SHARE xEFF RANK,  and
FOREIGN  SHARE  x EFF RANK  are the interactions  between SMALL SHAR.E  and SMALL  EFF RANK, STATE  SHARE and STATE EFF RANK, and FOREIGN  SHARE  and FOREIGN  EFF RANK,
respectiwlIy.  Time dummnies  are included, but are not shown  in the table.  ASIA, AFRICA,  and TRANSITION are  regional  dummnies (LATIN AMERICA  is the excluded  region).
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